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The contract template came as a ZIP file. Should you open it?

A contract template arrived as a ZIP file? Learn what to check before opening it and what to tell IT if you have already downloaded it.

Overhead view of hands on a laptop keyboard at a wooden desk with office supplies.
Illustrative photograph. The scene shown is unrelated to the events described. · Pavel Danilyuk / Pexels

You need a non-disclosure agreement template for negotiations starting this afternoon. One of the first search results leads to a page with the exact question you just typed. A button below offers the template for download. You expect a Word document and receive a ZIP archive. Before opening it, check who supplied the file and whether you can get the same template from a source you know.

On 12 November 2026, Europol and the U.S. Department of Justice announced the results of a phase of the international Operation Endgame. The operation targeted infrastructure including that used by Gootloader, malware distributed through compromised sites that offered fake legal documents. The Department of Justice reported removing the malware from more than 100 servers and seizing domains used to distribute or control it. The specialist publication The Record covered the news on 13 November. The announcements came on 12 November and described actions already taken, without giving a date for each one. 1, 2, 3

When a search result seems to answer your exact question

In earlier cases, Kroll found that attackers altered compromised legitimate sites so their pages would appear in searches for contract templates. A visitor might land on a page resembling a forum discussion and download a ZIP archive containing a JavaScript file named to match the requested document. Running the script could start an infection and lead to further attacks, including ransomware. Searching, downloading and running a file are distinct steps. Knowing how far you got helps IT assess how urgently to respond. 2, 4, 5

Before downloading, check the actual domain and who published the content. A page that repeats your search word for word may look highly relevant. To decide whether to trust it, look for the template on the issuing organization’s own website or ask your legal contact for an approved version. If you have already downloaded an archive from an uncertain source, leave it closed and tell IT. If you have extracted the files and see an extension such as .js where you expected .docx or .pdf, leave the file alone. IT can make file extensions visible on company computers and assess whether to restrict script execution for people who do not need it. 4, 5

What to tell IT if you already opened something

“I opened the contract” could describe three different actions. In your report, say whether you visited the page, downloaded the ZIP archive or double-clicked a file inside it. Include the approximate time, the filename, the device you used and the web address if you still have it. Avoid revisiting the page or forwarding the file in chat to show what happened. If you ran the script or think you may have, contact IT immediately from another device and follow your company’s procedure for isolating the computer from the network. Leave collection of the files and activity logs to the designated staff. 5

To reduce the risk, ask the people who prepare contracts which templates they most often seek outside the company. Put the approved versions in a shared folder with the last revision date and the name of the person who maintains them. In the same folder, say who to contact when a template is missing. The measure works if, on the day negotiations begin, finding the right document takes less time than looking elsewhere.

GRISK can help your business use open sources to verify the apparent origin of suspicious pages and domains and document findings for the people handling the incident.

Intelligence


Sources and editorial note

The opening scenario is hypothetical. Europol and the U.S. Department of Justice document the operation. The Record provides independent coverage. Kroll and Microsoft describe the technique observed. The workflow and the information to collect for IT are practical guidance from the editorial team.

  1. Europol, «6.4 million victim datasets secured in international operation against malware networks», 12 November 2026. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/64-million-victim-datasets-secured-in-international-operation-against-malware-networks
  2. U.S. Department of Justice, «Gootloader Malware Disrupted in International Cyber Operation», 12 November 2026. https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/gootloader-malware-disrupted-international-cyber-operation
  3. Jonathan Greig, The Record, «DOJ: Gootloader used in at least 44 ransomware attacks costing $29 million since 2018», 13 November 2026. https://therecord.media/gootloader-ransomware-doj-details
  4. Kroll, «A Deep Dive Into GOOTLOADER Malware and Its Infection Chain», accessed on 14 November 2026. https://www.kroll.com/en/publications/cyber/deep-dive-gootloader-malware-infection-chain
  5. Microsoft Security Intelligence, «TrojanDownloader:JS/Gootloader!rfn», accessed on 14 November 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=TrojanDownloader%3AJS%2FGootloader%21rfn&ThreatID=2147933959