
The HR team is finalizing payroll when a request arrives: “Please use this IBAN for my next salary.” The name is that of an employee, the message is short and the change looks routine. But whoever prepares the transfers needs confirmation that an email alone cannot provide: is the employee really requesting the change?
On 16 November 2026, several local news outlets reported that the Carabinieri in San Polo d’Enza had reported two people to the judicial authorities over an alleged fraud against a business in the Val d’Enza area. According to the published account, the suspects allegedly impersonated two employees by email, requesting new bank details for their salaries. One payment of more than €2,300 reportedly reached the specified account; a second was returned because the receiving account had already been blocked. Open covered the story on 17 November. The events date back to June and July: the reporting is recent, rather than the account change requests. Responsibility remains to be established. [1–3]
Seek confirmation outside the message
In the case described in the news reports, the requests allegedly arrived while the office was also handling genuine changes. An effective check therefore needs to work during routine operations, without relying on an obvious error in the wording. Before changing the employee record, contact the employee in person or on a number already held in company records. Ask them to confirm the request, the new bank details and the effective date. A number supplied in the same email is not an independent contact channel.
Replying “can you confirm?” in the same exchange leaves confirmation in the hands of whoever controls that channel. A signed form attached to the message also needs to be traced back to the person who is supposed to have completed it. The FBI/IC3 bulletin of 10 September 2019 explicitly describes fraudulent emails to payroll teams requesting changes to employees’ bank accounts and recommends verification through secondary channels. It is a reference on the fraud mechanism, rather than a source on the Italian incident. [4]
Who changes the record and who prepares the payment?
Establish a single process for changes that is also clear to people working remotely. This might be a request through the company portal followed by the confirmation required by the procedure, or a form delivered to HR with an identity check. Explain to employees where to submit it and which payroll cycle it will affect. If the payroll deadline is close, make clear who decides how to handle a request that has yet to be confirmed.
Record the date of the request, who verified it and when it was applied. Where the organization allows, have a second person check changed bank details before generating the payment file. The comparison needs to cover the confirmation obtained and the details actually entered: two approvals of the same fraudulent message leave the problem unresolved. Also restrict access to banking documents to people who need it.
If payroll is outsourced, agree who receives change requests and who checks their origin. An email forwarded by the company may appear to the external provider to have already been checked, while the company may expect the provider to carry out that check. Document the handover and keep the confirmation with the request so that authorization is not left implicit.
When an employee reports that their salary is missing
Before making a second transfer, reconstruct the first: the bank details used, execution date, outcome and transaction reference. If a diversion becomes apparent, ask the bank immediately to assess whether the funds can be recalled. Recovery is not guaranteed; elapsed time and subsequent movements affect the practical prospects. IC3 also recommends contacting the financial institution immediately when fraud is discovered. [4]
Preserve the original emails with their full headers, the change request, the available history of the employee record and the payment instructions. Involve the IT contact to determine whether the sender was spoofed or an account was compromised: the reporting on the Italian case does not establish which technique was used. Present the findings to the appropriate authorities and agree with those responsible for HR how to handle the unpaid salary. To check whether other employees are affected, start with recent changes and verify those that lack documented confirmation.
GRISK can help businesses reconstruct the communications and documentary steps in a suspected salary diversion, organizing findings for further investigation.
Sources and editorial note
The opening scenario is hypothetical. The case facts come from three outlets belonging to different publishing groups, which report the Carabinieri’s account: the original press release was not located and the case file was not consulted. These reports do not constitute independent verification of the underlying records. The sources place the incidents in June and July 2026; 16 and 17 November are the reporting dates. The FBI/IC3 source is a historical methodological document unrelated to this case. The organizational guidance represents the editorial team’s practical assessment.
- Antonio Lecci, Il Resto del Carlino, “San Polo, false mail per dirottare gli stipendi altrui”, 16 November 2026. Original article.
- Reggionline / Telereggio, “San Polo: finti dipendenti dirottano i bonifici degli stipendi sui propri conti. VIDEO”, 16 November 2026. Original article.
- Antonia Verderosa, Open, “Reggio Emilia, si fingono dipendenti e chiedono all’azienda di cambiare l’Iban: come funziona la truffa degli stipendi dirottati”, 17 November 2026. Original article.
- FBI/IC3, “Business Email Compromise — The $26 Billion Scam”, 10 September 2019, sections “BEC and Payroll Diversion” and “Suggestions For Protection”; accessed 18 November 2026. Original bulletin.
